Are Regulators And The Nuclear Industry Applying The Valuable Lessons Learned From Fukushima?

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About This Video

Fairewinds Presentation to the San Clemente City Council

Fairewinds chief engineer Arnie Gundersen discusses three nuclear safety problems uncovered during the Fukushima accident that nuclear regulators and the nuclear industry wish they could ignore. Why isn't the industry designing nuclear plants to withstand the worst natural events? Why aren't nuclear regulators, governments, and citizens who live and work near a nuclear plant prepared for a nuclear accident? How much does the NRC value human life? Finally, Fairewinds' Gundersen concludes that the NRC is not implementing adequate safety changes because the NRC believes that a serious accident is impossible.

Video Transcript

Arnie Gundersen: Hi, I'm Arnie Gundersen from Fairewinds and I would like to thank the San Clemente City Council for having me make this presentation to you.  I have to apologize, my voice is a little squeeky today.  With the change of seasons here in Vermont, I appear to have picked up a virus.  But I will be O.K.

I would like to talk to you today about the lessons that Fukushima should have taught us but did not.  The first one of those is something called the design bases.  Now what that means is:  what do we expect Mother Nature can throw at us?  For instance, a plant built in California is built for a stronger earthquake than a plant built in Vermont.  A plant built in Florida is built for a stronger hurricane than a plant in upstate New York.  So that is called a design basis:  what do we think Mother Nature can throw at us?  Now in law, that comes from 10 CFR: 10 Code of Federal Regulations part 50 appendix A which is something called a general design criteria.  And general design criteria number 2 talks about design bases.

But it is interesting, it is deliberately vague.  There is no mathematical number to support the fact that an earthquake must be this strong or a hurricane wind must be this strong.  It is not in law.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission takes that general design criteria and basically says we believe it is a good thing to build a plant for the worst thing that Mother Nature can throw at us in about a thousand years.  They go back over the historical record and they are supposed to find the worst thing that Mother Nature can do over the last thousand years of the geologic record.  Now, I do not think that has happened.  The first lesson of Fukushima, that we are not really learning, is we need to look at again, what we think is the worst thing Mother Nature can throw at us.

For example, The tsunami at Fukushima was well outside the design basis.  And so was the earthquake at Fukushima and some equipment at Unit 1 appears to have been damaged from the earthquake before the tsunami.

And two other events in the last 6 months also bump right up against the design bases.  One is the flood out in the Midwest at Fort Calhoun and the other is the earthquake on the east coast at North Anna.  Now all of these were right at or over what we thought the worst Mother Nature could do to us in a thousand years.  Now that four of these:  two earthquakes, Japan and Virginia, a flood and a tsunami, that all of them occurred in 6 months, tells me that we really have not anticipated what Mother Nature can really do.

Now let's do the math here.  The math is that, you know once in a thousand years sounds like a long time.  But really, if a nuclear plant runs for 60 years, put 60 in the numerator and in the denominator put 1,000 and you wind up with a 6% chance that any nuclear plant, over it's lifetime, will see an event as bad or worse than the design bases.  6% for San Onofre, 6% for Diablo Canyon, 6% for plants here in Vermont.  Well on top of that, there are about 60 nuclear sites.  So if you take that 6% and multiply by 60 sites, you get about 360%.

In other words, it is a near certainty that some plant in the United Sates over it's lifetime will experience an event worse than designers anticipated.  Matter of fact, more like 3 or 4 plants in the United States over the their 60 year life, will experience an event worse than the designers anticipated.  Now it is interesting though, that what the designers anticipate and what independent science anticipates are two different things.

It really boils down to cost.  The stronger you make a plant, the more costly it becomes.  So a plant in California costs more than a plant on the East Coast because earthquakes are stronger in California.  But a plant in Florida anticipates that it will get hit by a stronger hurricane than the winds you might anticipate in upstate New York.

Now outside independent experts actually have anticipated that we really have not designed for the worst case.  There were experts in Japan who said that the geologic record indicated 3 tsunamis as bad or worse than the one that hit them over a 2000 year period.  So experts in Japan, outside of the utility that owned the plant, were predicting that a tsunami could hit that was not just a 45 foot tsunami, but could even be higher, based on the record.  Those experts were ignored.  So as much as the design bases probably had been missed at least 4 times by industry experts, I think if you talk to independent experts, they will tell you that it is highly likely that a much worse event than what we have anticipated could occur.

For instance, San Onofre is designed for a one foot tsunami.  Now, on top of that San Anofre has added a margin so they can withstand about a 6' tsunami.  But on the other side of the ocean, they had a 45 foot tsunami.  I think there are experts who would say that a 6' tsunami is probably not adequate for San Anofre.

There are two things we can do to avoid this problem, neither of which is being done.  We can set a higher threshhold.  Rather than once in a thousand years, we can say once in a 10,000 year event.  Or we can listen to independent experts as opposed to industry experts when we are designing the plant.  But whatever we do on design bases, I think it is important to remember that it boils down to money.  The stronger the plant is to withstand what Mother Nature throws at us, the more likely it is to become cost prohibitive.

The second thing that I think we need to learn, and have not, has to do with emergency planning.  And within that, there are two parts.  If there is an accident, who pays?  And if there is an accident, who is in charge?  Tokyo Electric is worth about 100 billion dollars.  The event in Japan is going to cost about 250 billion dollars.  So Tokyo Electric is probably going to be driven into bankruptcy as they pay for this.  They are going to have to sell their assets and the rest is going to have to be borne by the Japanese people.

Now in the United States, it is different.  We have something called Price-Anderson.  And that limits the liability to the company that has the accident to about 10 billion dollars and the remainder, 240 billion dollars would be borne by taxpayers.  It would be the biggest industrial accident that has ever occurred within the United States.

Now, within the United States the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has allowed something to happen which actually minimizes costs.  Makes it impossible to go back at most of the utilities that own power plants.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has allowed them to become limited liability corporations.  Now what that means is, let's take Illinois for example:   Excelon has 17 power plants, most in Illinois.  And each individual power plant is a limited liability corporation.  So if a power plant has an accident, it has no more assets and the other power plants are not the cause of the accident, therefore they do not have to carry the bill.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has allowed this to happen by changing the licenses of power plants. They used to be owned by utility companies and there were assets behind them.  Now each nuclear plant is a limited liability corporation.  "Who pays?" is a really good question.

The second question is who is in charge?  In Japan I think you have noticed the confusion about who is in charge.  And I would submit to you that the Japanese are the best prepared in the event of an emergency.  They really took emergency planning seriously for years because they had earthquakes frequently.  And even now clearly, no one really knows who is in charge of cleaning up Northern Japan and who is in charge of cleaning up the site.

It is interesting, I have noticed as I have studied accidents over time that when an accident happens, the plant management recognizes really quickly that things are really bad.  At Three Mile Island the plant manager at 7:30 in the morning wanted to declare an emergency and evacuate.  Now he called the people at the home office about 150 miles away and they talked him down from that.

At Chernobyl, the same thing happened.  The plant management understood that things were really bad.  But yet the bureaucracy did not really recognize it and did not spread the word.  Of course at Fukushima we have exactly the same problem.  Plant management wanted to inject salt water.  They needed to inject salt water.  And yet higher ups in the chain of command in Tokyo told the plant manager not to.  He is a hero, he did what had to be done, despite the fact that the government told him not to.  You get this situation where the people on the ground (at the scene of the accident) know how bad things are, but yet further up the chain of command people do not make the right decisions.

In Japan the Fukushima Prefecture (like a state), had potassium iodine pills available.  What they do is they block the radiation that goes to your thyroid.   They were stocked and they were ready to be used.  But the state was prohibited from using them by the national government in Tokyo.  It was not for 7 days until the national government realized that they should release these potassium iodide pills.

Again the people on the ground (at the scene of the accident)  really recognize the severity of the problem.  But when larger organizations get involved, the time to respond lengthens and puts lives at risk.

Now in the United States the situation is probably even worse.  The Japanese understood how to do emergency planning and they still did not do it right.  Here we probably have 5 different entities that would be perhaps in charge.  First would be the utility.  Second would be the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  Environmental Protection Agency.  FEMA.  And then also it is possible that the state could also say, "It is our job."  So we have 5 different organizations.  FEMA cannot do it, FEMA is prohibited by law to be involved for more than 30 days, something called the Stafford Act.  12:29  So they are out of the picture.

After Three Mile Island the utility was in charge briefly, and then the Nuclear Regulatory Commission came in and reported directly to the President of the United States.  Now that is not part of any law or any plan.  And I would submit to you that allowing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be in charge is not the best thing to do if you are concerned about the health and welfare of the people surrounding San Clemente and the San Anofre plant.

The reason is that right now there is a battle between the EPA and the NRC over the exposure to people after an accident.  The NRC wants 100 times higher exposures to the population after an accident than does the EPA.  To get an idea about what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission really plans to do after a severe accident, it is a good idea to look at a computer code they use called the MACCS2 computer program.  It is used to determine the costs and benefits to society and whether or not a utility has to implement changes to the design in order to minimize the costs to you and I.

It was designed not for a nuclear power plant accident but for a dirty bomb.  And the designer has actually renounced the program for the use the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is using.

What are some of the assumptions they have in the code?  They only look at some forms of cancer, not all, and they also do not look at other health effects caused by radiation, for instance, cesium attacks children's hearts.  And it does not cause cancer but it causes heart attacks and heart ailments.

The code does not evaluate that.  They assume that the radiation that lands on a field will be plowed under.  There is no attempt by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to clean the fields after a nuclear accident.  They hose down the houses and let that water run into the rivers, and interestingly, if it lands on a forest, they do not plan to touch the forest.  The contamination will stay there until it decays in 300 years.  This MACCS2 program takes into account no storage of radioactive material.   There is no attempt to put radioactive material into drums and store it until it decays away.  Basically the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is assuming that it stays on the ground and in the ground, until 300 years are up and the Cesium has disappeared.

The program assumes that all the radiation stays on the ground and does not get resuspended.  A car on a dusty road throwing up dust is not included in the calculation.  Probably the most illogical assumption in the computer program is that they assume the accident lasts for two and a half hours.  Yes, two and a half hours.  Now Fukushima has been releasing radiation for 7 months but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in their severe accident code assumes the releases occur for 2 1/2 hours.

They also assume that not much fuel is damaged, so the releases are no where near as severe as Fukushima.  They assume that the wind blows in a straight line.  As you look at the maps of contamination that came out of Fukushima, that is clearly not true either.

And last but not least, they give the owner, the plant owner, the option of paying compensation or cleaning up.  Compensation is always cheaper than clean up.  And so when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission runs this program, compensating someone for their loss is always much cheaper than cleaning up and that always turns out to be the direction the decisions are made.

So this MACCS2 program is designed to talk about costs and benefits to society.  Now even with all these assumptions which minimize the benefits to society, the MACCS2 code has actually predicted some changes should be made.  At Indian Point, it was discovered by the State of New York that 14 times the MACCS2 code said, "These changes are cost beneficial."  The state wrote to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about this and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responded by saying they are required by law to evaluate, to consider the changes, but even if they are cost beneficial, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not required to implement the changes.

I teach math at the local college here in Burlington and one of the things I teach is GIGO, garbage in, garbage out.  What that means is that the output of a computer program is only as good as the information going into it.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission puts the lowest value on a human life of any agency in Washington.  It assumes a human life is worth 3 million dollars.  Other agencies are 5 to 9 million dollars.  So with all the assumptions I just talked about plus a low value of a human life, it is very unlikely that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will force a utility to make modifications and it is very unlikely that you would really want them to be the agency in charge in the event of a nuclear accident.

The person who wrote the MACCS2 code is a guy named David Chanin and he has renounced it.  I wanted to share with you his own words about the code and how it is being improperly used:   "Even in 1975 the cost numbers were underestimated to a significant degree.  The underestimation is much more significant today." ... "There are quite a few things that never made sense to me, but Sandia National Labs was directed by the NRC to continue using the prior approach."  And the final quote is:  "It seems to me that the code's Quality Assurance shortcomings and the lack of input justifications are again being ignored."

This MACCS2 computer program is the key decision making tool that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission uses when they make decisions about whether a plant should be licensed for the next 20 years or when they make decisions about when a safety modification is necessary.

As I said before, GIGO, garbage in garbage out,  The code is only as good as the assumptions that go into it.  Minimize a human life or assume the cleanup is minimal, and you will justify very, very few safety modifications, which is what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does pretty routinely.  Interestingly though, as I said in New York State, a letter to the State of New York from the NRC says that there have been 50 times when the MACCS2 computer code has determined that a safety modification would be beneficial.  And yet the NRC has ignored it even when it's code shows that a safety modification is necessary.

The real problem then lies with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and how it implements safety modifications.  Not only does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission see no accidents, hear no accidents, speak about no accidents, but I think there is a fourth monkey too.  And that is that they believe no accident can occur.  And if that is the case, I submit to you that an accident is likely to happen because our regulator is not enforcing the regulations that are on the books.

I would like to thank the San Clemente City Council for having me tonight.  If you have any further questions or would like to study this even more, there are other videos on the Fairewinds website.

Thank you.

Nuclear Oversight Lacking Worldwide

Fairewinds disagrees with a recent New York Times Opinion that claims that Fukushima was caused because Japanese regulators did not properly oversee Tokyo Electric. Fairewinds shows that in the United States, the same cozy relationship exists between the NRC and the nuclear industry. Proper regulation of nuclear power has been coopted worldwide by industry refusal to implement the cost to assure nuclear safety.

Video Transcript

[tabs][tab title="English"]

Arnie Gundersen: Hi, I'm Arnie Gundersen from Fairewinds.

Today I would like to talk to you about the the relationship between the people who own nuclear reactors and the people who regulate nuclear reactors, not just in the United States, not just in Japan but worldwide. What made me think of this topic was an opinion piece in the New York Times just last week. The opinion piece was written by a University of Southern California professor and he specializes in studying how countries regulate nuclear power. In it he says that the Fukushima accident was, and this is a quote, "the result of failures in the safety culture.... Japan's nuclear regulatory agency, for instance, was never really independent of a nuclear industry. The plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power, had a long history of disregarding safety concerns and a woefully weak safety culture that was allowed to operate with minimal government oversight." He goes on to suggest that the solution for this problem is "what we need now are much closer co-operation between countries and the regulators."

I disagree with what that University of Southern California professor suggests. We do not need closer co-operation between countries. What we need to do is to enforce the safety standards that we already have. Blaming Fukushima on a cozy relationship between Tokyo Electric Power and the Japanese government is wrong. It implies that other countries are doing it better. And that is not true. And that is really what I would like to talk about in this video.

The fuse for Fukushima was lit 45 years ago when Fukushima I was built by an American company and an American architect engineer, using an American design. To claim that the problem with Fukushima is a cozy relationship between the Japanese regulator and the people at Tokyo Electric is really disingenuous and it gives the entire nuclear industry a shield to hide behind.

Until 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was regulated by something called the Atomic Energy Commission. Now the Atomic Energy Commission or the A. E. C. had a charter and it was to promote and to regulate. Now Congress realized that that was not working. What they did was they split the Atomic Energy Commission into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy. The theory was that the Department of Energy would promote and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would regulate. But what really happened was that the team stayed the same and all they did was change the name on their jerseys.

In 1974 Congress recognized that things were too cozy. So let's fast forward into the 80's and see if things had changed. On the site is a report from 1987 and it is entitled "NRC Coziness With Industry". That is not my name for it, that is the congressional report's name, "The NRC's Coziness With Industry." And it is written by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the United States Congress. It is long, it is a hundred pages and it is typed so it is scanned in, but I thought I would read 3 of the highlights to you.

The first highlight is that the congressional staff and congresspeople discovered that "The NRC staff interfered with and undermined an investigation of a licensee's wrongdoing at the Fermi plant in Michigan."

The 2nd issue that they discovered is that a Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner, one of the five appointed commissioners, "engaged in behavior that constitutes malfeasance and reflects a continuing closeness with the nuclear industry." This is 1987.

And the last one that I would like to call to your attention is that they found, "Despite the fact of an adequate administrative record demonstrating that a problem was in need of a solution, the commission issued a rule severely restricting the ability of it's own staff to require safety improvements at existing nuclear facilities."

Lets jump forward one more decade here and we will go to the 1990's. In the 1990's, the Inspector General for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was a man named David Williams. He wrote a letter to the Commissioner saying that the problem with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was that they listened to the people who owned the nuclear power plants and not to the people who have legitimate concerns. His exact words were, "The NRC relies on the assurances of licensees."

Now I was part of that report. I brought some safety concerns forward to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and they were ignored. And in the process, discovered a very cozy relationship between the regulator and the people that they were attempting to regulate. It went to congressional hearings with John Glenn and in the congressional hearings the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said this: "It is true. Everything Mr. Gundersen said was absolutely right. He performed quite a service." Nothing changed after that hearing. What he said to Congress had no affect on the way the agency was behaving.

Well, lets fast forward another decade and start at the beginning of the 21st century. There is an excellent journalism piece out and it is in the Austin Chronicle. It is investigative journalism at its very best and it is called, "Will Shill For Nukes." The author of it discovered that an industry group, NEI, the industry trade organization, was writing opinion pieces and they were then giving those opinion pieces to professors around the country and asking those professors of nuclear engineering at universities around the country, they were asking those professors to put those in the local newspapers. Well, quite a few professors obliged. So opinion pieces written by the nuclear industry were given to university professors and put with the university professor's name into editorials in local newspapers touting the benefits of nuclear power.

Now what makes this really interesting is that one of the university professors that is mentioned in the story is a man named Dale Klein. Mr. Klein became the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission one year after that investigative journalism report was issued.

Well, as a final one, let's look at just two years ago. The NRC's Inspector General wrote a report about one of the NRC's commissioners. This gentleman's name is Jeffrey Merrifield. Now Commissioner Merrifield was determined to have been looking for a job in the nuclear industry while he was a commissioner. He was calling the people he regulated and asking them for work. Not only that, he found work. And for his last couple of months on the job, he was making decisions that were favorable to the person who was going to employ him at a million dollars a year once he left the NRC. Well that report is also on our site and that makes for interesting reading.

Today, things really have not changed. Just last month, there was a meeting with the International Atomic Energy Agency. They had it in private. And in that meeting were industry executives and heads of government.

That a serious accident happened in Japan is not a statement about the Japanese culture. Rather it speaks to the pressure that the nuclear industry exerts on nations worldwide. It can happen in your country.

Thank you.

[/tab][tab title="日本人"]

世界中で徹底されていない原子力管理体制

こんにちは。フェアウィンズのアーニー･ガンダ‐センです。今日は原子炉を所有している側と原子炉を規制する側との関係についてお話したいと思います。これはアメリカだけの話ではなく、日本をはじめ世界中においてのことです。先週NYタイムスに載っていたある論説を目にしてこのことについて考えさせられました。その論説というのは南カリフォルニア大学のある教授によって書かれたもので、その教授は各国の原子炉の規制について研究している方です。その論説で、教授はフクシマの事故について「安全神話のなかで起きた怠慢の結果であり（中略）安全保安院ひとつをとってみても、原子力産業から独立した機関ではありませんでした。原発を稼働している東電は今まで長きにわたって安全性を軽視し、政府からの監視を最小限に抑えてつつ原発を稼働できるような、お粗末としか言いようのない脆弱な安全体制だったと言えます」と語っています。そして、こうした問題の解決案として、「国と規制機関をもっと緊密に共同運営させる必要がある」と提案しています。

私は教授の意見には賛成しません。国同士のより緊密な連携など必要ありません。我々がやるべきことは今ある安全基準をきちんと守らせることであり、フクシマの事故の原因を東電と日本政府の蜜月関係にしてしまってはいけません。それでは他の国々は日本よりきちんと管理しているということになってしまいます。実際はそうではないはずです。今日の動画ではこのことについてお話したいと思います。

フクシマの稼働が始まったのは４５年前。福島第一原発はアメリカの設計で、アメリカの会社が建設しました。福島原発の問題を日本の原発規制機関と東電との蜜月関係だと断定してしまうはごまかしであり、原発業界全体の隠ぺい体質に蓋をしてしまうことになります。

１９７４年までNRC（原子力規制委員会）は原子力委員会という名前の機関によって規制されていました。原子力委員会（AEC）は外郭支部として推進、規制を行っていましたが、アメリカ議会はこうした状況がうまく機能していないと認識していました。そこで、AECをNRCとエネルギー省の２つに分割しました。エネルギー省が推進を担当し、NRCが規制を担当するというのがもともとのコンセプトでしたが、実際には中のスタッフはすべて同じでユニフォームのゼッケンを替えただけでした。

１９７４年にアメリカ議会は慣れ合いが過ぎると認識していました。さて８０年代に飛んでみましょう。状況は変わったのでしょうか。 ここに１９８７年に発行された報告書があります。そのタイトルは『業界とNRCの慣れ合い』で、米議会の内務島民事務局の委員会が作成したものです。とても長い１００ページある報告書で、スキャンイメージされたものですが、みなさんには３点ピックアップして読んでみたいと思います。

まず最初のポイントは、議会内部のスタッフや議員たちは「NRCはミシガン州のフェルミ原発の許認可の不正捜査を妨害、誘導している」ことを突き止めました。

第２に、５人のNRC委員の１人が「不正に抵触する行動をとっており、原子力業界と引き続き緊密な関係を 保っていることを表わしている」ということが調査で発覚しました。

最後に、みなさんにもよく聞いてほしい部分なのですが、調査で「解決すべき問題があることを十分示す記録が豊富に挙がっているにも関わらず、NRCは既存の原発において自らが安全性の向上を促す義務を制限するようなルールを課している」 と書かれています。

ではもう１０年飛んで、１９９０年代にいきましょう。１９９０年代、ＮＲＣの監察総監は、デビッド・ウィリアムス氏という方でした。彼は委員への手紙で、ＮＲＣの問題は、彼らは原子力発電所を所有する人々にだけ耳を傾け、原子力に真っ当な懸念を抱いている人たちの話を全く聞かない、と書いています。彼の正確な言葉だと、「ＮＲＣは、受注業者の受け売りに依存している」というものです。

当時、私のことも一部、その報告書に触れられました。私はＮＲＣに安全性に関していくつか問題点を報告しましたが、無視されました。その過程で、規制機関と規制の対象になるものとの間に蜜月関係があることを発見しました。この蜜月関係は、ジョン・グレン上院議員との議会の公聴会にも影響を与えました。その公聴会でＮＲＣ議長はこう言いました。「これは真実です。ガンダーセン氏の発言は完全に正しかった。彼はとても貢献してくれました。」ですが公聴会の後、何も変わりませんでした。ＮＲＣ議長の議会への発言は、規制機関の行動に何も影響を与えませんでした。

では更に１０年進んで、２１世紀初めへ進みましょう。オースチン・クロニクル誌に掲載された素晴らしい報道記事がありました。記事は調査報道として秀逸で、『原子力のためのやらせ（Will Shill For Nukes）』というタイトルです。この記者は原子力業界の交易組織であるNEIが論説を書き、それらを国内の原子力工学専門の大学教授へ送り、地域の新聞へ寄稿するよう依頼していることを突き止めたのです。結構な数の教授が便宜を図りました。原子力業界によって書かれた論説が大学教授に渡され、大学教授の名前で地域の新聞の社説に掲載され、原子力の有益性を売り込んだのです。

さらに興味深いのは、話の中で触れられている大学教授のひとりに、デイル・クライン氏の名前があることです。この調査報道レポートが掲載された１年後、クライン氏がＮＲＣの議長になっているのです。

さて、最後に、２年前のことになります。NRCの検査官長がNRCの委員の１人について書いた報告書があります。この方はジェフリー･メリーフィールドという方です。メリーフィールド委員は、委員である間になんとか原子力業界で再就職先を見つけようと思っていました。そこで彼は、規制される側の人たちに呼びかけ、仕事の斡旋を頼んでいたのです。頼んだだけでなく、実際彼は就職先を見つけました。委員として最後の２，３ヵ月間彼は再就職先に有利になるような決定をしていました。NRCを退職したら年間１００万ドルの年収を約束してくれている再就職先です。その報告書のこのウェブサイトに掲載されています。興味深い報告書です。

今日、事態はまったく変わっていません。ちょうど先月、国際原子力機関との会合がありました。非公開で行われ、原子力業界の重役と、政府高官たちが集まりました。

日本で起きたこの重大な事故は、日本の文化に特有の話ではありません。むしろそれは世界中の国々に、原子力業界が強いている圧力を物語っているのです。このことは、あなたの国でも起こりえるのです。

ありがとう。

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Newly Released TEPCO Data Proves Fairewinds Assertions of Significant Fuel Pool Failures at Fukushima Daiichi

About This Video

New TEPCO data measured on August 19 & 20 shows severe damage to the spent fuel in Fukushima Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3. The adjacent TEPCO table posted on the front page shows incredibly high levels of Cesium 137 and Cesium 134 in all three spent fuel pools of Units 1, 2, & 3. This TEPCO data clearly contradicts and refutes the July assertion by the NRC the Fukushima Daiichi spent fuel pools were not damaged in this tragic accident. Crytome (cry to me) has a new high resolution photo, also uploaded, that shows the extensive damage of the Unit 3 spent fuel pool and the reactor building. Check it out.

Video Transcript

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Arnie Gundersen: Hi, I'm Arnie Gundersen from Fairewinds.

Today, I wanted to spend a brief amount of time updating you about the condition of the fuel pools at Fukushima. You recall that in our last video, I discussed the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was told by the NRC staff that there was no damage to the spent fuel pools at Fukushima. Well, I disagreed then, and I disagree now. Just 2 days ago, TEPCO released a report that has a water analysis of the condition of the spent fuel pools at Fukushima. This data was taken in August, August 19th and 20th, so it is very current and I wanted to share it with you today. The table is a water analysis and it says “analysis of spent fuel pool water.” Let's go to Unit 2 and then cross over to Cesium 137. If you look at that column, it says 1.1 E8. Now what does that mean? That is 1.1 with 8 zeros behind it, or 110 million disintegrations per second in every liter of water. If you look at the next column over, that is Cesium 134. It is also 1.1 E8. So the combination of both Cesiums in the fuel pool on Unit 2, is 220 million disintegrations per second in a liter of water.

So think of a liter Coke bottle and inside it the water is disintegrating at 220 million disintegrations every second, and that is just for Unit 2. The table also shows similar very high concentrations of Cesium in Unit 1 and in Unit 3. It clearly shows that there is damage to the fuel in those 3 units. The interesting thing about the table is that it shows much lower concentrations of Cesium in Unit 4. Now, it still could be that there is damage, but less damage in Unit 4. Or it could mean that contamination from the other 3 units fell into the water in Unit 4 and contaminated that water. So Unit 4 is a bit of a mystery, but Units 1, 2, & 3 clearly have significant spent fuel damage.

Next thing I would like to talk to you about briefly is that when we posted our video last week, several people wrote in saying, “Where did you get the information about spent fuel being thrown a mile away?” The information comes from the New York Times in an April 5th story. The April 5th story is based on a Nuclear Regulatory Commission report that was confidential, but old time visitors to the Fairewinds site will remember that we posted it in early April as well. The report clearly indicates that material was thrown over a mile away. Here is what the Times had to say. The NRC "document also suggests that fragments or particles of nuclear fuel from the spent fuel pools were blown up to a mile away from the units .... and that pieces of highly radioactive material fell between the units and had to be bulldozed over, presumably to protect the workers on site.”

So in April, actually late March, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission report says the fuel pools were so damaged that they threw material a mile away. Yet in July, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was told by the staff that that never happened and in fact, the fuel pools are in great condition. Again I disagree. I think the fuel pools are not in great condition.

Now to add to that, there is a new picture up on the web by Crytome, and it was just taken 2 days ago. It shows Unit 3. It is incredibly high resolution. It shows damage, extensive damage, fuel pool is on the right. Now I invite our readers to go over it in detail and take a look and see what you can see. To me, it shows serious fuel pool damage and I cannot understand how the NRC would think otherwise.

Finally, I need to correct something I said in the last video. In the last video, I talked about how salt water was introduced at Fukushima, came in contact with neutrons, and created sulfur. That part is right. In the last video though, I said that the sodium in the salt water is what came in contact with the neutrons and created sulfur. What really happened was it is the chlorine. Salt water is sodium chloride and I misspoke and I said the sodium, not the chlorine came in contact with the neutrons. I would like to thank the watchers of this column who identified that. I do not use a teleprompter and sometimes my mouth goes a bit faster than my brain.

Well, that is about it for today. We will keep in touch after the hurricane.

Thanks.

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フェアウィンズが指摘した燃料プール破損が東電の最新データで裏付けられる

８月１９日と２０日の２日にかけて取られた東電のデータによると、福島第一原発１号機、２号機３号機の使用済み核燃料プールに激しい損傷があることが分かった。 データに付随する表によると、１，２，３号機の使用済み核燃料プールにかなり高いレベルのセシウム１３７と１３４が検出された。 このデータは７月に使用済み核燃料プールへの損傷を否定したNRCの公表と明らかに矛盾する。 Crytomeが新たな高画質の写真を公開しました。その写真から３号機の使用済み核燃料プールと建屋の損傷がさらによく見えます。検証してみましょう。

2011年8月26日

東電の新データはフェアウインズが主張していた燃料保管プールの著しい損傷を証明

要約：東京電力が8月19日と20日に公表した新たな計測データにより、福島第一原発の原子炉1号機、2号機、そして3号機の使用済み核燃料プールが深刻な損傷を受けていることがわかりました。表紙に掲載された表は1号機、2号機、3号機すべての使用済み核燃料プールにおいて、極めて高いセシウム137とセシウム134の数値を示しています。

この東電のデータは原子力規制委員会（NRC）が7月に福島第一原発の使用済み燃料プールは、この悲惨な事故下においても損傷していないとの主張を明らかに否定、矛盾するものとなっています。Crytome (Cry to me)は新たな高画質写真をアップロードしており、その中には3号機の使用済み燃料プールと原子炉の大規模な損傷を写したものが含まれています。是非ご覧になってみてください。

こんにちは、フェアウインズのアーニー・ガンダーセンです。

今日は福島第一原発の核燃料保管プールの状況について、少しのお時間をいただき皆さんにアップデートをご報告させていただきたいと思っております。

前回のビデオで覚えていらっしゃるかと思いますが、原子力規制委員会（NRC）がNRCのスタッフから、福島第一原発の使用済み核燃料プールにダメージが無いとの報告を受けていた事について、私は議論いたしました。私はその報告に納得しておらず、そして今も納得していません。ちょうど2日前、東電は福島第一原発の使用済み燃料プールの水分析レポートが含まれる報告書を公表しました。そのデータは8月19日と20日に取ったもので、非常に最近のものであります。本日はそのデータの内容を皆さんと共有してみたいと思っております。この表は水分析データで「使用済み核燃料プールの水分析」と書かれています。まず2号機のセシウム１３７を見てみることにいたしましょう。表のこの列を見ていただきますと、1.1E+08と記録されています。さてこれは何を意味しているのでしょうか？これは1.1の後にゼロが８個続くという意味で、また水1リットルに対し毎秒1.1億の放射能性元素の崩壊を表します。隣の列をみてください、こちらセシウム134です。ここも同じく1.1E+08とあります。したがって2号機の燃料プールの両方のセシウムを合計すると、1リットルの水に対し毎秒2.2億の放射能性元素の崩壊となります。

ですから1リットルのコーラのボトルの中に水が入っているとしたら、その水に毎秒2.2億の放射能性元素の崩壊が起こるということです。それがまさに2号機で起こっているのです。その表からは1号機でも3号機でも、同じように非常に高いセシウム濃度が示されています。そのデータは、それらの3機における核燃料保管プールに損傷があるという事を明確に示しています。興味深い事に、この表では4号機のセシウム濃度が比較的低く示されています。まだ損傷している可能性は残されていますが、4号機の損傷は他と比べると少ないと考えられます。しかし、もしかしたらこれは他の３機からの汚染が４号機の水に落ちてきて、４号機の水を汚染したのかもしれません。そういったわけで４号機に関しては少し謎でありますが、１号機、２号機、３号機に関しては使用済み燃料が著しい損傷を受けているという事は明確であります。

次に私が皆さんに簡潔にお話させていただきたいのは、先週私共がアップロードしたビデオに対して、複数名の方から「使用済み核燃料が１マイル先まで飛散したという情報を何処から得たのですか？」というご質問を受けた件についてです。情報は４月５日付けのニューヨークタイムズの記事から得ました。この４月５日付けの記事は原子力規制委員会(NRC)の報告書の機密事項となっているものでした。フェアウインズのウェブサイトを昔からご覧いただいている方々は、我々が４月上旬にアップロードしたビデオを覚えていらっしゃるのではないかと思います。その報告書には破片が１マイル以上も飛散した事が明確に書かれています。タイムズ紙にはこのように書かれています。「NRCの報告書は核燃料の断片もしくは粒子が使用済み核燃料プールからの爆発によって、原発から１マイル以上も離れた場所にも吹き飛ばされた事を示唆・・・そしてその高レベル放射能性物質の破片は原発施設内の原子炉の間に落ち、現場で働く労働者を保護するべく、ブルドーザーで動かさなければならなかった。

そして４月、実際には３月後半の原子力規制委員会(NRC)の報告書には燃料プールがひどく損傷しており、破片が１マイル以上も吹き飛ばされたと言及していました。しかし７月に原子力規制委員会はNRCのスタッフから、そんな事は一度も起こっておらず、実際燃料プールは問題ない状態にあるとの報告を受けたのです。

重ねて申し上げますが、私はこれに同意できません。私は燃料プールが問題がない状態にあるとはとても思えません。それに加えCrytomeのウェブサイトでわずか２日前に撮影された新しい画像がアップロードされました。ご覧いただいているのは３号機の写真です。この画像は素晴らしく高画質で撮れた鮮明度の高い画像です。この画像からは燃料プールの右側に損傷、非常に大規模の損傷があることを写しだしています。私はこのビデオを見てくださっている皆様に、この画像の詳細をご自分の目でじっくりご覧いただくことをお勧めいたします。私にとって、これは燃料プールの深刻な損傷を示すものであり、なぜ原子力規制委員会(NRC)がそう思わないのか理解できません。

最後になりますが、前回のビデオで発言した事について修正させてください。私は塩水がどのようにして福島原発に使われたのかについて、中性子と触れて硫黄を生成したと話ました。その部分はあってます。しかし前回のビデオでは塩水中のナトリウムが中性子と触れ硫黄を生成したと述べました。実際には塩素です。塩水は塩化ナトリウムですが、これを誤ってナトリウムと言い間違いました。塩素が中性子と反応したのです。このご指摘をしてくださった視聴者の方々に感謝をいたします。 私はテレビ用プロンプター装置を使わないので、私の口は時々私の脳より少し速く動いてしまうのです。

では今日のところはこのくらいです。ハリケーンが去った後で、またお会いしましょう。

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